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Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore
CLASSIFICATION AND AMBIGUITY:
THE ROLE OF DEFINITION IN
A CONCEPTUAL SYSTEM
Abstract: With the advent of the semantic web, the problem of ambiguity is
becoming more and more urgent. Semantic analysis is necessary for explaining
and resolving some sorts of ambiguity by inquiring into the relation between
possibilities of predication and definition of a concept in order to solve problems
of interpretation of natural language discourse. Computing is now confronting
such problems of linguistic analysis (Diggelen et al. 2004), and it is worth inquir-
ing into the development of linguistic studies that can be useful for developing
the theoretical background of ontologies. Our proposal is to develop a workable
solution that passes between the horns of the dilemma posed by the traditional
metaphysical approach versus the modern relativistic account. We interpret the
ancient notion of essential definition in a pragmatic perspective, and show how
the dialectical definition by genus and difference corresponds to the semantic
analysis of the definiendum.
Keywords: semantics, argumentation, definition, ontologies, classification
1. Introduction
Semantic analysis of a certain sort is shown in this paper to be necessary
to allow interlocutors understand each other, and to deal with problems of
polysemy and ambiguity. What ontologies deal with is not simply the rela-
tionship between words and meanings, but rather the organization of con-
cepts in systems. The distinction (see for instance Niremburg and Raskin
2001, p. 154) between names of concepts and the structure of concepts, and
the analysis of the latter as a tool to resolve ambiguity, suggests the need for
an instrument of semantic analysis, providing a description of the concept.
What will be offered in this paper is a pragmatic system of definition to
be used as a dialogical tool for resolving misunderstandings and conflicts
of opinion. Conceiving definition in a dialogical way is shown to conflict
with both traditional and modern approaches to definition. The concept
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of “essential definition” was regarded in longstanding philosophical tradi-
tion as a purely metaphysical concept, expressing the immutable essence of
a thing. However, this quest for the essence of things led only to metaphy-
sical speculations and to unsolvable conflicts of opinion arising from them.
The approach failed to achieve any real success in helping rational persons
to reach agreement what a thing essentially is, and as a consequence the
notion of essence has long been considered as an unknowable and useless
abstraction. Modern studies on definition have long abandoned the theory
of essential definition and have generally moved a relativistic approach in
which definitions are seen as stipulative and even arbitrary. For example, on
Schiappa’s influential view (Schiappa 2003) definitions are seen as a mat-
ter of choice, preference or convenience. On this perspective, the evident
impossibility of knowing what a thing essentially is, and therefore which
definition is properly acceptable, or objectively better than a competitor,
becomes a reason to accept any definition. The new dialogical approach to
definition presented below offers a middle way between the old metaphysical
account of essential definition and the dominant relativistic view that has
been accepted as its alternative. The dialogical definition is based on the
concept of an endoxon, a commonly accepted proposition that can be used
to lead to a particular conclusion and, when questioned, has to be supported
by arguments. In this new pragmatic approach to definition, the problem
of the essential characteristics of a thing is resolved in terms of common
opinion: the question the dialogical definition wants to answer is not “What
a thing absolutely is”, but “What a thing is commonly considered to be,
based on evidential considerations pro and contra”.
Definitions can be analyzed from a dialogical viewpoint in two regards.
On the one hand, definitions are instruments for classifying, or naming,
reality, and therefore potential instruments for supporting a viewpoint or
leading to a further conclusion (see Zarefsky 2006, p. 404). Naming reality
can be in itself an implicit argument used to support an unstated conclusion.
For instance, if we classify a fragment of reality as “monopoly”, we elicit an
implicit judgment on the denoted thing. As monopolies are commonly con-
sidered hindrances to the free market economy, they are commonly judged
as bad. However, if we name the same fragment of reality as “strong com-
pany”, the value judgment will be noticeably different. What determines
the attribution of the two distinct predicates to the same entity, and the
different value judgments they can elicit, is their definition. Whereas “mo-
nopoly” presupposes that there is not competition, a “strong company” is
simply a company that defeats the competition. On the other hand, defini-
tions can be challenged, or not accepted by the interlocutor, and need to be
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grounded on arguments. Definitions, in other words, cannot be considered
matters of choice, but, on the contrary, should be seen as matters of com-
mon ground, or commitment. The best definition is the definition that is
shown to be grounded on the deepest commitments.
Placing the notion of definition in the domain of dialogical evaluation
allows one to interpret it as an instrument of semantic analysis. Definition
becomes in this perspective an instrument for building what in computing
is called a shared ontology (Bennett 2004; 2005), which can be organized by
means of primitive concepts. The purpose of this paper is to show the role
and importance of semantic analysis in communication and argumentation,
and to propose reconsidering a pragmatic reconfiguration of the ancient no-
tion of Aristotelian definition as an instrument for situating concepts within
a conceptual system. In particular, we focus on the evidential ground of the
concept of definition and its argumentative consequences, distinguishing it
from the modern idea of definition and ontology in computing.
2. Implicit knowledge and levels of commitment
One of the most fascinating aspects of human communication is not
what is actually said in a conversation, but what is not said. All human
communication is grounded upon what is already known or accepted as
information that can be taken for granted, and makes verbal interaction po-
ssible. We can call this basis of human communication “common ground”
or “common knowledge”, adopting respectively a linguistic or an argumen-
tation terminology. In the latter approach to the implicit aspects of commu-
nication, the set of data taken for granted in a dialog is analyzed in terms
of commitment (Walton and Macagno 2006), defined as propositions a par-
ticipant in a discussion has gone on record on accepting, or what is implied
by these. A participant in a dialog is dialogically held to defend her com-
mitments in case they are challenged. In a discussion, participants assert
propositions and explicitly commit themselves to particular propositions,
but what is actually said is only the tip of the iceberg of what the par-
ticipants are implicitly committed to. For instance, consider the following
claim:
Dr. Johnson said that you have the flu, therefore you should stay in bed
In asserting this proposition, the speaker is taking for granted:
1. That Dr. Johnson’s opinion is a ground to support the point of view
that the interlocutor has the flu, that Dr. Johnson is an expert, that
having the flu is a reason to stay in bed;
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2. That the speaker is supposed not to be lying, the expert is taken not
to be biased and is taken to be telling the truth as he knows it;
3. That the speaker and hearer are in a particular relationship;
4. That both know who Dr. Johnson is, that flu is an illness, that a doctor
is a human being, that staying in the bed helps when a person is ill,
that beds are in houses, and so on.
We should also notice that these implicit propositions are not on the
same level. Some of them (1) are directly involved in the argument, or bet-
ter (Rigotti and Cigada 2004; Rocci 2007) in the communicated inference,
while others (2) are the ground for the burden of proof, or rather, are dia-
lectical rules establishing who has to prove his point of view or criticism.
The implicit premises indicated at level 4 represent the deepest level, which
encompasses the shared knowledge of the world, which may conceived as
the common ontology. Common ontology is the fundamental condition of
human communication, because it structures the possibility of talking about
the same concepts. The third layer, in turn can be divided into two different
levels. The relationship between doctors and human beings, concerning mat-
ters such as between flu and illness, is established by a semantic constraint,
whereas the fact that beds are normally in houses depends upon the know-
ledge of society, customs, and ways of living. The first level represents the
semantic information the interlocutors have to share in order to understand
each other, while the second level represents a different kind of encyclopa-
edic information. The first level pertains to how reality is organized within
a conceptual system, and thereby a linguistic, system, while the second re-
presents the way things usually are or should be. We can represent these
layers of common knowledge as follows:
Figure 1. Levels of Common Knowledge
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The focus of this paper is on the layer of knowledge of the world, and in
particular on the ontological-semantic system shared by the interlocutors.
This level is the most important one, since it constitutes the basis for mutual
understanding, and is the object of inquiry in computing in the field of
ontology. The crucial problems are how to distinguish it from the other
type of encyclopaedic knowledge, how to ground it, and how to organize it.
3. Conceptual system and semantics
The semantic-ontological conceptual system is the basis for communica-
tion, because it represents the level of meaning which words manifest. The
failure to share a common system of concepts and instruments for situating
a concept in the system itself inevitably leads to failures in understanding.
To use an Aristotelian expression, the risk is one of talking about the same
words and not about the same things (Aristotle, Topics I, 18). In computing
the problem has been tackled by the study of ontology, which we now show,
indicates the usefulness of a turn towards a linguistic and structuralist kind
of semantic analysis. Several ontologies, as will be explained, seem not to
distinguish between the two types of encyclopaedic knowledge mentioned
above, risking the error of classifying concepts according to their role in
a society, as opposed to classifying them according to their properties in
a semantic system. The need for a linguistic grounding of ontologies stems
from the necessity of finding a common ground for communication inde-
pendently from cultural and sociological considerations. The solution is to
reconsider the ontological-semantic structure of language in a pragmatic
sense, that is, in relation to the conditions of predication.
3.1. Ontologies and semantics
Ontologies are systematizations of entities that we can interpret as con-
cepts, independently from their existence (see for instance, Guarino 1995,
p. 628). Ontologies, in particular formal ontologies, are concerned with re-
lations between concepts, including syntagmatic relations establishing the
possible inferences that can be drawn from a concept. These relations, such
as the part-whole or the causal relation, generate inferences that cannot be
grounded upon logical form alone, that is on the simple relation between
quantifiers (see also Winston, Chaffin and Herrmann 1987, p. 489). In on-
tologies, in Guarino’s view, there is a logical abstract level that needs to
be distinguished from an epistemological and ontological layer, in which the
relations are not between abstract entities but hold between concepts on
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the basis of the way the concepts are organized according to their internal
structure. The expression “organization of concepts” is however, extremely
vague. How can concepts be organized? What are the grounds for such clas-
sifications? What problems arise from different types of classifications and
how can they be resolved?
In computer science (see Dahlgren 1995, p. 813, Passin 2004, p. 142),
an ontology is a system of concepts within a given domain. Ontologies are
grounded on classifications of entities according to different criteria, such
as the “natural”, or “social” system of classification that can be articulated
into sub-systems like “foods in the store”. For instance, the concept of law
can be described according to two different ontologies, the legal and the
scientific one. The polysemy of the word ‘law’, which can be described as
having the two interrelated meanings of statutory law and scientific law,
is explained in terms of two different systems of classification, or ontolo-
gies (see Walton 2006, p. 13). The problem of ambiguity is thereby simply
shifted from the equivocation caused by the use of a word to the equivo-
cation generated by different ontologies. The solution proposed (see for in-
stance van Diggelen et al. 2004) is to create connections between ontologies,
namely a metadialogue constituted by a “ground” ontology allowing one to
find a common ground between different onotological systems. However, the
crucial question is how to build a ground ontology on which an ontological
system is based. A solution to this problem is suggested by some theoretical
developments in computer science, which propose, instead of taxonomies of
concepts, definitions of concepts based on natural language. In other words,
a possible answer can be a semantic-ontological description of a concept,
instead of a taxonomy based upon epistemological or other encyclopaedic
knowledge.
The question of how to ground an ontology might be taken as the start-
ing point for a brief survey on some developments of ontologies. In (Dahlgren
1995, p. 810) ontologies are described as about “what there is”, that is, about
the world conceived as a possible perspective on reality, such as language,
mind, and culture. Language, in Dahlgren’s theory, is in particular a ground
of ontology encompassing both the objects of the world and the culture
that classifies them, namely, in Bateman’s (1995, p. 934) terms, common
sense, intersubjective reality. In other terms, the analysis of a conceptual
system should be based on the semantic properties that exist in a natural
language.
The study of natural language is the basis for the construction of seve-
ral ontological systems, considering both the semantic and syntactic level
(see for instance, Dölling 1995; Nirenburg and Raskin 2001; Dahlgren 1995).
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On the one hand, the analysis of the differences between words in the same
language and in different ones is useful to discover the simpler constituents
of meaning (Nirenburg and Raskin 2001, p. 154). On the other hand, lingu-
istic theories about collocations and analysis of words in context are useful
to discover semantic-syntactic properties of predicates. For instance, the
predicate ‘round’ can be predicated only of things (Dölling 1995, p. 790),
while ‘alive’ can be predicated only of animate beings (Jan-Beun et al. 2004,
pp. 7–8). The analysis of predicates into ontological sorts becomes an instru-
ment to analyze the possibilities of predication, and thereby a useful tool
for disambiguating polysemy or homonymy (see for instance Dölling 1995).
For example, the predicate ‘to telephone’ can be semantically well-formed
only in contexts in which the first argument (the subject) is characterized
by the feature ‘to be a person’. In a sentence such as ‘The newspaper te-
lephoned’, the semantic ambiguity of ‘newspaper’ (the paper or the group
of people forming the institution) is resolved by the semantic constraints of
the predicate.
Several types of ontologies, we should notice, suggest semantic represen-
tation of concepts in order to explain the possibilities of predication. These
studies can be taken as an effort to ground the concept of “what things are”
in natural language.
To conclude, computer science needs to recognize two different types of
answers to the problem of concept description for avoiding equivocation in
communication: taxonomies of concepts and what we can call “essential”
definitions of concepts. While in the former polysemy and ambiguity is de-
scribed in terms of domains and standards of classification, in the latter
the concept is described according to its syntactic and semantic properties.
For instance, whereas the polysemy of ‘law’ is taxonomically explained re-
ferring to two different ontologies, at a semantic level it can be analyzed
describing the characteristics of the two concepts denoted by the word. One
cannot choose to compel a decision to act with a scientific law, but a juri-
sprudential law can compel a decision to act through the use of penalties.
The analysis of semantic properties of concepts introduces the problem of
what a semantic description is and, as a consequence, what a definition is.
Some possible answers to the first question can be found in contemporary
linguistic theories.
3.2. Ontological semantics in linguistics
One of the first theoretical models approaching the problem of how
to analyze predicate structure was that of Katz and Fodor (1964). Their
approach was grounded on the notion of anomaly, or conceptual absurdity
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(Katz 1972, p. 91). For instance, consider the following examples given by
Katz (1972, pp. 91, 93):
(1) Saturday is in bed.
(2) Propositions feel oily.
The incongruity of these propositions is described in terms of predicate
structure (p. 91): “a concept has a range of predication specified as a ca-
tegory that determines the concepts with which it can combine in forming
assertions”. The structure of the predicate ‘to feel’ in (2) determines a range
of predication (a category) characterized by the feature ‘animate sentient
being’ occurring as subject. Likewise, in order for (1) to be meaningful, the
concept occurring as subject must have the feature ‘animate being’. The
categorical conditions determine what constitutes the anomaly. Anomaly is
distinguished by Katz (1972, pp. 181, 221) from contradictoriness, the im-
possibility of attributing determinate opposed properties or relations to an
entity (e.g. ‘John has a hairy bald head’).
In Katz and Fodor (1964), every lexical entry is analyzed into its se-
mantic fundamental features, called semantic markers and distinguishers.
For instance, consider the example below (p. 496):
Figure 2. Lexical analysis by fundamental semantic features
Category mistakes cause conceptual anomalies of a kind that, in Katz’ view,
are necessary conditions for the semantic anomalies. For instance, the con-
ceptual incongruities analyzed above lead to the sentences they occur in
being semantically anomalous.1
1 This distinction between semantic anomaly and categorical incongruity is drawn in
order to explain meaningful sentences such as ‘He says he smells itchy’ (p. 95).
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As with the theories of ontology mentioned above, the theory of seman-
tic analysis of predicates can be applied to ambiguity, resolving potential
sentential ambiguity to semantic polysemy or homonymy (for the notion
of sentential ambiguity see Edlow 1977, p. 12). Adopting this perspective,
(Katz 1964, p. 93) explained semantic anomaly as the limit of composition
of the possible meanings of words. For instance, we can analyze the fol-
lowing case (p. 93): “The division was slaughtered by cannon fire”. Here,
the possibility of the lexical item ‘division’ to refer to a kind of ‘mathe-
matical operation’ is ruled out by the incongruity that would arise by the
composition with the predicate ‘to be slaughtered’.
Katz’ predicate analysis has been developed in Rigotti (1997; 2006) and
Rigotti and Rocci (2004) by explaining absurdity and congruity in terms of
presuppositions and argument places. A predicate, on this view, imposes on
its arguments a series of presuppositions,2 namely, a set of semantic traits
the argument must have in order to fit the argument place of the predicate.
For instance, the predicate ‘to read’ can be analyzed as follows:
Figure 3. Predicate-argument analysis
The argument paradigms X1 and X2 are characterized by a set of se-
mantic features; the failure in satisfying these congruity conditions leads to
absurdity. For instance, a dog cannot read a stone. However, the failure in
satisfying the presuppositions of argument paradigms can be a helpful tool
for discovering polysemy. The signifiant ‘to read’ can manifest several predi-
cates, whose arguments are characterized by different semantic features. In
the sentence ‘The computer reads the file’, the predicate presupposes in X1
a decoding machine, and in X2 a coded piece of information. In this case
the apparent incongruity can be solved by retrieving a different meaning of
‘to read’, namely ‘to decode’.
From this brief overview of computational and linguistic theories on
meaning analysis, it is possible to come to understand the roles of clas-
2 Presupposition is a controversial notion in linguistics (see for instance Dineen 1979).
Presuppositions in Rigotti’s approach are necessary conditions of meaningfulness.
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sification and definition in resolving problematic cases of ambiguity. The
classification of concepts and the analysis of predicates by means of semantic
features bring us back to reconsidering the Aristotelian account of essential
definition as an instrument to retrieve and describe concepts in a seman-
tic-ontological system.
4. Classification and Definition
Computing studies have pointed out how ontologies need to be grounded
on a semantic-ontological system. Linguistic studies, in their turn, showed
how the deep structure of predicates and concepts can be founded on a hie-
rarchy of predicates determining the conditions of congruity and meaning-
fulness. These investigations introduce another crucial question: how can
given semantic information be organized to retrieve and situate a concept
within a conceptual system? Even though several studies can be mentioned,
which take into consideration definition in its different types and uses (see
for instance Robinson 1950; Stevenson 1944; Schiappa 2003), none of them
has analyzed definition in terms of semantic analysis, that is, a concept
as used in a natural language. If ontologies can be developed as organi-
zations of concepts according to their semantic properties, the instrument
that can be used for this purpose can be found in the ancient notion of
definition (horismos). The idea of organizing concepts by means of “logi-
cal priority” (Topics, VI, 4) and conditions of meaninglessness bring us to
the idea of definition as a predicable, that is, a logical-semantic relation
between predicates. The concept of “real” definition can be interpreted not
on a metaphysical level regarding what reality is, but on a logical level con-
cerned with the issue of how predicates should be structured (see Vanni
Rovighi 2002, p. 68).
4.1. Predicables and definition
In the history of definition, including the dialectical, rhetorical, and
logical traditions, different types of definition have been described. For in-
stance, Victorinus in De Definitione surveyed 15 types of definitions, while
the modern accounts of Robinson (1950) and Leonard (1957) list 18 and
57 different types. These methods of defining are not equivalent; on the
contrary, their logical and semantic properties are noticeably different. For
instance, we can take into consideration four kinds of definition: etymolo-
gical definition (cartoon from cartone, that is, heavy paper), definition by
genus and difference (man is a rational animal), definition by definite de-
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scription (man is a being that laughs), and definition by integral parts (a car
is made up of an engine, four wheels ...). While an etymological definition
can be considered to be a definition of the signifiant, more than of the thing
signified, a definite description is useful only for identifying the concept, de-
finition by genus and difference shows the essential semantic features of the
concept signified. Moreover, while definition by genus and difference and by
definite description is convertible with the definiendum, the same does not
apply to definitions by integral parts and etymology.
In order to understand the function and role of essential definition,
it is useful to define it. Definition (horismos) in the Aristotelian topics is
described as a predicable (Topics I, 5), namely a class of semantic-logical
relations of predication. Predicates can be attributed to a species, and con-
sequently to individuals, in four different fashions: genus, definition, pro-
perty and accident. The species, which we can interpret as the concept,
is what is predicated of more individuals different in number and is con-
ceived as a dialectical semantic relation. For instance, ‘man’ can be predi-
cated of different people (John, Karl ...), but does not explain a semantic
feature of John. For this reason, species was held to fall outside the domain
of dialectic.3
The four predicables, namely definition, genus, property, and accident,
are divided into two main categories: predicables revealing the essence of the
“thing” and predicables not expressing the essential features of the subject.
We present the Aristotelian classification as follows (see Rigotti 2006):
Showing the essence Not showing the essence











the thing. Does not
express the essence.
Ex: Man is a reason-
able animal.
Ex: Man is an animal Ex: to talk (man) Ex: This man is
strong
Definition shows the essence of the thing, here defined pragmatically
as its fundamental (most important) features. For instance, if something is
a “man”, it is necessarily an animal and it is potentially reasonable. The
3 See also Crowley & Hawhee, 1999, p. 54; Green Pedersen, 1984, p. 119. Aristotle
(Topics, I, 10), considers a dialectical proposition to be a proposition held by everybody,
or the majority, or the wise. Dialectic (Topics, I, 14) is about science, and science is not
concerned with particulars.
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genus shows what the species is, but it is not convertible with the thing
itself. For instance, “man” is necessarily an “animal”, but an animal is not
a man.
Definition and property are convertible with the species they are pre-
dicated of. For instance, if we accept that “reasonable animal” is the defi-
nition of “man”, we can substitute “man” for “reasonable animal” in any
sentence. Likewise, a property of man, one that is predicated of only one
species, is “grammaticus”, or “able to learn grammar”. If we describe “man”
as “the being able to learn grammar”, we can substitute the species with
its description in any sentence, but the description does not show what the
thing is.
Consider the recent controversy that led to a debate within the Interna-
tional Astronomical Union that led to Pluto being classified as a non-planet.4
In 2006 the IAU presented a definition laying down three essential criteria
for a celestial body to count as being a planet (Soter 2007, p. 1). First, it
has to be in orbit around the sun (the orbit criterion). Second, it has to
have sufficient mass so that it has formed into a nearly round shape (the
roundness criterion). Third, it has to have cleared the neighborhood around
its orbit (the sufficient clearance criterion).
Property is what is predicable of only one species. It is divided into
absolute and relative. An instance of absolute property can be “pitch”, used
as an adjective, which can be only be predicated of the term “black”, or
“talkative”, which can only be predicated of “man”. The notion of property
is extremely interesting for understating Aristotle’s approach to semantics.
An absolute property can be interpreted as the relation between a predicate
and its argumentative class. For instance, the predicate ‘to read’ presupposes
an argument which is characterized by being human. In Aristotelian terms,
we can say that “to read” is a property of human and that a human is a being
who is able to read. Property is distinct from difference, because the latter
express the characterizing feature of the predicate and is a condition for the
predication of the property. For instance, ‘reasonable’ distinguishes ‘man’
from other kinds of animate beings, but only rational beings can laugh or
read. ‘Reasonable’ can in this view be seen as the semantic feature characte-
rizing the predication of property. Property can be also relative, permanent,
or temporary. For instance we can describe man as the two legged animal
if we want to identify him in a group constituted by quadrupeds. Such
a relative property holds only generally, and can be subject to exceptions.
4 The debate can be found at this site: http://www.astronomy2006.com/media-stream-
archive.php
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For instance, if we describe a bird as a flying animal, the property holds only
generally. Although Tweety is a bird, and birds generally fly, the inference
defaults in the case that Tweety is a penguin.
Accident is described by Aristotle as “something which can belong or
not belong to some one particular thing” (Topics 102b, 6–7). A man, for
instance, can be drinking or not drinking, but this accident does not affect
the fact that he is a man. However, man can drink or not drink inasmuch
as he is an animal (we could also say that to drink is one of the properties
of being an animal), but a stone cannot be predicated of the action ‘to
drink’, because it is not under the genus ‘animal’ (see Rigotti 2006). The
possibilities of predication, in other words, are established by the essence of
the thing predicated.
Definition is constituted by the proximate genus and the specific diffe-
rence. Aristotle defined the genus as answering the question “what is it?”,
asking for the essence of the thing. For instance, a human is a being, a living
being, and an animal. All these predications fall within the category of the
genus of ‘human’, but only ‘animal’ is the proximate genus. In fact, if we
accept the definition of man as rational animal, ‘rational’ specifies the genus
animal into the two concepts of humans and irrational animals. The genus
‘animal’ can be predicated of several species, such as humans and donkeys
or dogs. It expresses the fundamental features of the concept, but not all
of them. Definition of relative terms (Topics VI, 6), which we can interpret
as predicates in the predicate-argument theory, must specify the characteri-
stics of the argumentative places it presupposes. For instance, (Topics VI, 8),
knowledge is “conception of a knowable”.
We suggest that this system of predicables is useful for understanding
the criteria underlying the concept of an essential definition and its onto-
logical-semantic grounding. An essential definition involves the situation of
the concept defined within a conceptual system by means of its distinctive
semantic features. Moreover, definition by genus and difference is basically
an instrument of semantic analysis in which the possibilities of predication
are explained in terms of hierarchy of predicates. The approach to defini-
tion at a logical level allows one to distinguish between predicates that are
essential from other accidental or proper predicates.
If we conceive the essential definition in a dialectical perspective, de-
fining the essence of a thing becomes highlighting the simpler predicates the
definiendum is constituted of, allowing the interlocutor to understand what
the definiendum is. The definiendum is in this fashion connected with the
interlocutor’s more basic commitments, or rather his shared ontology. From
an argumentative point of view, the notion of “essential” characteristics
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is of twofold importance: it is a criterion for distinguishing between what
a thing is and how a thing is, and for separating definitions from metapho-
rical descriptions. We can explain these characteristics using three different
definitions of “embezzlement”.
1. Embezzlement is theft of assets (usually money) entrusted in your care
2. Embezzlement is siphoning of another’s money
3. Embezzlement is a fraud committed by many employees
In (2) the definition does not show the essential properties of the definien-
dum, but, instead of explaining what it is, it hides its meaning under a me-
taphor. In (3) the definiendum is described by means of one of its properties
(or accidents), but its meaning is only explained in a vague and general fa-
shion. In (1), at last, the definiendum is explained by connecting it to the
more generic and shared concept of “theft”, and differentiating the thing
defined by the other types of theft using the difference “of assets entrusted
of your care”.
Knowing what a concept is, and situating it within his own conceptual
system is essential for judging the thing defined. For instance, whereas in (1)
“embezzlement” is clearly connected with concepts the interlocutor is acqu-
ainted with, and is able to judge, in (2) and (3) a clear value judgment is
harder to be elicited. Whereas the notion of “theft” is shared and commonly
judged as negative, “siphoning” or “fraud” are vague and less known. For
this reason the value judgment cannot be clearly expressed (for the use of
euphemisms or vague terms in law to avoid eliciting value judgments, see
Blakey 1982). Definition, therefore, is a dialectical instrument for knowing
the thing defined. Knowledge is argumentatively relevant because it allows
one to judge the thing defined, and therefore to act accordingly. Definition
by genus and difference, moreover, is of fundamental importance at the ar-
gumentation level, because of the topics, or patterns of inference, associated
with it.
4.2. Definitions and inferences
As mentioned above, it is possible to define a word in several ways, such
as by genus and difference, description, integral parts, and etymology. At
a semantic level, as seen above, essential definition is the only type of defini-
tion explaining the congruity conditions of a predicate. At an argumentation
level, we will now show, definitions are noticeably different, being characte-
rized by different logical assumptions.
The first distinction is between definitions in which the definiens is
convertible with the definiendum, and definitions in which the relation of
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convertibility does not apply. Definitions by etymology and by integral parts
belong to the first group, whereas essential and descriptive definitions are
characterized by convertibility. In definition by integral parts, we should
notice that the definiens is not necessarily convertible with the definien-
dum. For instance, if we consider definition by integral parts as following
the scheme X is A and B, we can notice that there are cases in which the
conversion does not hold. For example, consider the following sentence (To-
pics, 150a 1–5).
Justice is temperance and courage
As Aristotle noticed, two people, each of whom has one of these qualities, can
together be just, without singularly being so. The other scheme of definition
from integral whole is ‘X is made of A and B’. However, we consider the
following argument.
A house is made of four walls and a roof. The house has been destroyed.
Therefore, the walls and the roof have been destroyed
It should be observed in this case that the predicate attributed to the de-
finiendum does not necessarily apply to the definition. This type of falla-
cious reasoning can be labelled as fallacy of division (see Engel 1990, p. 103
for further examples), namely improperly implicating the properties of the
parts from the properties of the whole. The definition by integral whole is
not convertible with the definiendum because it is not subject to the same
predications.
Definition by etymology turns on the interpretation of a name, namely,
and on linguistic strategy to manifest a meaning. This kind of definition is,
however, not convertible with the species defined. What is defined is not
the concept, but the manifestation of the concept. An argumentation from
etymological definition can cause fallacies, such as the following fallacious
inference (Walton 1996, p. 167).
The word “truth” is derived from the verb “throw”, to believe. Therefore,
there is no eternal or immutable truth.
In definite descriptions by absolute property and definitions by genus and
difference, the definiens is convertible with the definiendum. We can sum-
marize the inferential patterns which characterize horismos and description
as follows (Petri Hispani Summulae Logicales, 1990, pp. 52–54):
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• Loci a definito / a definitione
1. Thing defined/definition as subject of
predication (Positive)
2. Thing defined/definition as subject of
predication (Negative)
Maxima: Whatever is predicated of the
thing defined is predicated of the definition
as well, and vice versa.
Maxima: Whatever is removed from the
thing defined is removed from the definition
as well, nd vice versa.
Example: A company exclusively controlling
the market is contemptible. Therfore
a monopoly is contemptible.
Example: A company exclusively controlling
the market is not helping the economy.
Therfore a monopoly is not helping the
economy.
1. Definition as predicate (Positive) 2. Definition as predicate (Negative)
Maxima: Whatever the thing defined is
predicated of, the definition is predicated of
as well, and vice versa.
Maxima: From whatever the thing defined
is removed, the definition is removed as well,
and vice versa.
Example: Bob embezzled his company’s
funds. Therefore Bob stole the funds
entrusted to his own care.
Example: Bob did not embezzled his
company’s funds. Therefore Bob did not
steal the funds entrusted to his own care.
In an essential definition, unlikely in the definitive description, the pro-
ximate genus must be specified, involving for this reason the inferential
patterns described in the Topics. The predication must follow the following
principal topics (Summulae Logicales, p. 56; Topics, IV, 120b 12–123a 27):
Maxims Examples
Anything predicated of the species is
predicated of the genus as well
Embezzlement can destroy the economy of
a country. Therefore theft can destroy the
economy of a country.
Whenever genus is removed, species is
removed as well
Bob never stole anything. Therefore he
never embezzled his company’s funds.
The species can be predicated of the
definition of the genus, not vice versa.
Embezzlement is theft. Therefore
embezzlement is the crime he crime of
taking someone else’s property without
consent.
The genus is predicated of what the species
is predicated of.
Bob embezzled his company’s funds.
Therefore he committed a crime.
It is impossible for something to be
predicated of the genus if it is not predicated
of one of its species.
Bob never embezzled, robbed, skimmed,
and rustled. Therefore you cannot call him
a thief.
What is placed in the genus cannot be
predicated of the definition of anything
contrary to the genus.
Embezzlement is not cunning. In fact
embezzlement is a crime, and cunning is not
a crime.
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Essential definition, as shown in the subsections above, is characterized
by semantic and logical properties which allow one to situate the concept
defined within a conceptual system. This system, being grounded on ne-
cessary semantic features, can be common to different types of ontological
classifications. In such a fashion, in a clarification dialogue essential defini-
tion can play a fundamental role, constituting the more basic classification
system common to different types of conceptual representation. Moreover,
topics from genus and definition characterize essential definition by means
of necessary rules of inference.
5. Conclusions
The conceptual system put forward in this paper showed how our prag-
matically reconfigured version of the notion of essential definition can be
used to situate the concept of definition within the system. Our conceptual
system presented a level of common knowledge coinciding with the lingu-
istic code used by the interlocutors, and distinguished from other types of
implicit commitments belonging to the sharing of the same dialogical rules,
inference rules, endoxa, and habits and customs of a society. The organi-
zation of such a conceptual system is highly useful for current computing
on the semantic web, because of its capability for allowing interlocutors to
understand each other and avoid harmful ambiguity. Ontologies have tackled
the relation between concepts using a semantic criterion grounded on the
possibilities of predication and a more logical one based upon the notion of
classification. The field of linguistics offers possible theoretical developments
of the principles used to organize concepts, such as a hierarchical descrip-
tion of predicates by means of fundamental features of meaning and their
presuppositions. Modern studies on semantics lead towards a tentative of
grounding descriptions of concepts on linguistic structure. The paper has
shown how this direction can be pushed further by looking at suggestions
offered by the Aristotelian theory of definition. We interpret definition by
genus and difference in dialectical, and not metaphysical, terms, and show
how the underlying principles are the semantic properties of predicates and
their logical relations. By this means, definition by genus and difference
is shown to be an extremely useful method for situating a concept within
a semantic system. Comparison between what we now call the pragmatic
version of the notion essential definition with other types of definition has
demonstrated the superiority of the former both at the level of foundations
and at the level of determining which logical inferences can properly be
drawn from a definition.
17
Douglas Walton, Fabrizio Macagno
References
Aristotle (1969), Topics, inW. D. Ross, ed., The Works of Aristotle, Oxford
University Press, Oxford.
Bateman, J. (1995), ‘On the relationship between ontology construction
and natural language: a socio-semiotic view’, International Journal of
Computer Studies 43, 929–944.
Bennet, B. (2005), ‘Modes of concept definition and varieties of vagueness’,
Applied Ontology 1 (1), 17–26.
Bennet, B. (2005), ‘Relative definability in formal ontologies’, in A. Varzi
& L. Vieu, eds., Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on
Formal Ontology in Information Systems (FOIS-04), IOS Press.
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